1. Is municipal water pressure and availability becoming a real problem in South Africa’s urban centres?

Yes. The evidence points to a growing and material problem, although it is not uniform across all metros.

South Africa’s major urban centres are facing increasing municipal water reliability issues driven by a combination of:

• Ageing municipal pipe networks
• High non-revenue water losses
• Leaks and burst mains
• Illegal connections
• Deferred maintenance
• Pump station failures
• Inadequate reservoir capacity
• Loadshedding or wider power instability affecting pumping infrastructure
• Urban growth and increased demand
• Drought and climate variability

The issue is particularly acute in parts of Gauteng, where Johannesburg and surrounding municipalities have experienced repeated supply interruptions, reduced reservoir levels and pressure management interventions. There are repeated references to high-lying suburbs being especially vulnerable because municipal water pressure becomes insufficient when reservoirs are low or pump stations underperform.

Water losses in some metros are severe. Johannesburg has been reported as losing a very significant proportion of water through physical losses, illegal consumption and system inefficiencies. eThekwini has also been highlighted for very high water losses. Cape Town appears comparatively better managed, with lower water losses and stronger pressure management, but even Cape Town remains exposed to water availability shocks, as demonstrated during the Day Zero period and its continued reliance on careful demand management.

The important point for insurance purposes is this: the concern is not only whether water exists somewhere in the municipal system. The concern is whether adequate firefighting water, at the required flow and pressure, will be available at the exact point and time of a fire.

That distinction is critical. A building may have municipal water under normal domestic conditions but still fail to provide adequate fire flow for hydrants, hose reels or fire sprinkler systems during an emergency.

2. Why this matters for firefighting generally

Firefighting depends on reliable water supply, pressure and access. When municipal water systems become unreliable, the fire risk profile of an urban property changes materially.

The main impacts are:

• Firefighters may arrive at a site and find insufficient hydrant pressure.
• Hydrants may deliver water, but not at the flow required for meaningful fire attack.
• High-rise buildings become more exposed where municipal water pressure cannot support upper levels without boosters.
• Fire brigade response becomes more complicated where water tankers are needed.
• Fire spread risk increases because early suppression becomes less effective.
• Neighbouring properties become more exposed where firefighting water is delayed or inadequate.
• Business interruption losses increase because fires that should be contained may spread into larger events.
• Areas with unreliable municipal services effectively move from a “managed fire risk” environment to a “higher uncertainty” environment.

For insurers, this changes the risk from a conventional property exposure to one involving infrastructure dependency. The insurer is no longer only assessing the building, occupancy, construction and fire load. They are also assessing whether the external municipal water system can still support the fire protection assumptions on which the policy was priced.

3. Impact on fire sprinkler systems in particular

Fire sprinkler systems are highly dependent on hydraulic certainty. A fire sprinkler installation is designed around defined assumptions:

• Required design density
• Area of operation
• Flow rate
• Minimum operating pressure
• Duration of supply
• Hazard classification
• Available water source
• Pump performance, where pumps are installed
• Storage reserve, where tanks form part of the design

If the original design assumed reliable municipal water supply, and that supply is now weaker, intermittent or pressure-managed, the fire sprinkler system may no longer perform as intended.

The practical implications include:

• Sprinklers may activate but fail to deliver sufficient water density.
• Pumps may not receive adequate suction pressure or water volume.
• Systems may run dry before the required duration is achieved.
• Pressure fluctuations can compromise performance at remote sprinkler heads.
• High-risk storage occupancies may become particularly exposed because they often require high flow and pressure.
• A system may still appear “installed” and “maintained”, but may not be hydraulically adequate under current municipal water conditions.

This creates a significant gap between visual compliance and functional reliability.

From an insurance perspective, that gap is dangerous. A fire sprinkler system is often priced into the risk as a loss control measure. If the municipal water supply behind that fire sprinkler system is no longer dependable, the insurer may reassess the entire property risk.

4. Why insurers are becoming more demanding

Insurers are reacting because large fire losses are heavily influenced by whether fire suppression systems actually work in the first few minutes.

Where municipal water infrastructure is unreliable, insurers are increasingly likely to require evidence that the property does not depend solely on municipal water pressure. Their concerns are generally practical rather than theoretical:

• Can the fire sprinkler system operate independently if municipal water pressure drops?
• Is there a dedicated fire water reserve?
• Is the reserve protected from domestic or operational use?
• Are pumps correctly designed, maintained and tested?
• Is there an ASIB clearance or recognised fire engineer sign-off?
• Are hydrants, hose reels and fire sprinkler installations tested regularly?
• Are impairments reported immediately?
• Has the fire load or occupancy changed since the system was designed?
• Are there storage practices that exceed the original fire sprinkler system design?
• Can the fire brigade access water and the premises effectively?

Insurers are also hardening their approach because annual policy acceptance does not necessarily mean long-term acceptance of a non-standard or marginal system. A system accepted by one insurer, or accepted in a previous underwriting cycle, may not be acceptable after a risk survey, large market loss, change in reinsurance appetite, or broader concern over municipal water reliability.

5. What insurers expect of policyholders

Policyholders should expect more active fire risk management obligations around water-based fire protection.

Typical expectations include:

• Maintain all fire protection systems in working order.
• Test pumps, valves, alarms and water supplies at required intervals.
• Keep written maintenance and inspection records.
• Ensure fire sprinkler systems remain appropriate for the actual occupancy and storage configuration.
• Notify insurers of any impairment, disconnection, pressure failure or system shutdown.
• Notify insurers of changes in occupation, storage height, commodity type or building use.
• Complete risk survey recommendations within agreed timeframes.
• Obtain competent fire engineering advice where municipal water supply is insufficient.
• Avoid assuming that municipal approval alone will satisfy insurer requirements.
• Avoid relying on old certificates where municipal water supply conditions have materially changed.

Policyholders should also understand that if an insurer has made a fire protection requirement a policy condition, warranty, subjectivity or risk improvement requirement, failure to comply may have serious claims consequences.

6. The practical problem: tanks and pumps are not always feasible

Your concern is well founded. Retrofitting dedicated fire water tanks and fire pumps is often suggested as the obvious answer, but it is not always practically possible.

Common obstacles include:

• No available ground space for a fire water tank.
• Structural limitations on roofs, podiums or basements.
• Access constraints for installation.
• Heritage or planning restrictions.
• Shared ownership or body corporate approval delays.
• Limited electrical capacity for fire pumps.
• Noise and vibration issues.
• Boundary constraints.
• Basement flooding risks.
• Security concerns around external equipment.
• Cost disproportionate to the property’s value or rental income.
• Tenanted buildings where operational disruption is difficult.
• Older buildings where pipework cannot easily be upgraded.
• Dense urban areas where fire tanks cannot be placed without compromising parking, access or trading space.

This creates a difficult underwriting and client-management issue. The insurer may be technically correct that an independent fire water supply is required, but the property owner may be unable to implement it in the conventional way.

7. Alternative interventions where tanks and pumps are not practical

None of the following should be presented as an automatic substitute for a compliant fire water supply. However, they can form part of a reasoned fire risk improvement plan, particularly where the standard tank-and-pump solution is physically impossible.

A. Updated hydraulic assessment and flow testing

Before accepting that a tank is the only option, the owner should commission proper testing:

• Hydrant flow and pressure test
• Fire sprinkler system hydraulic review
• Municipal water supply confirmation
• Assessment of peak and off-peak pressure
• Test of high-level or remote sprinkler heads
• Review of original design assumptions against current municipal water conditions

This helps separate perceived risk from measured risk.

B. Engage the insurer before proposing alternatives

The worst outcome is for a policyholder to spend money on a “rational” alternative that the insurer later rejects.

A better approach is:

• Appoint a competent fire engineer.
• Document why tanks and pumps are impractical.
• Quantify the actual water shortfall.
• Propose a layered fire risk mitigation plan.
• Obtain insurer approval in writing before implementation.

C. Smaller distributed water storage

Where one large tank is not possible, consider whether distributed water storage can be used:

• Smaller modular tanks in multiple locations
• Basement or service-yard tanks
• Slimline tanks where space is constrained
• Compartmented tanks
• Shared fire water storage between adjacent buildings
• A dedicated fire water reserve within an existing water storage system, if acceptable and properly protected

This may not work for every risk, but it can be more practical than one large external tank.

D. Shared or precinct-level fire water solutions

In industrial parks, sectional title schemes, commercial precincts or mixed-use developments, a shared fire water solution may be more realistic than requiring each owner to install a separate system.

This could include:

• Shared tank farm
• Shared pump house
• Ring main serving multiple buildings
• Common hydrant network
• Formal maintenance agreement
• Clear cost-sharing and legal responsibility

For landlords or bodies corporate, this may be the most practical long-term solution.

E. Alternative water sources, subject to approval

Where municipal water supply is unreliable, alternative water sources may assist, depending on quality, reliability and approval:

• Boreholes
• Treated greywater
• Rainwater harvesting
• Reclaimed water
• On-site reservoirs
• Nearby private water sources

However, these cannot simply be connected without proper design. Water quality, sediment, corrosion, biological growth, pump reliability and legal permissions all need to be considered.

F. Fire load reduction

If water supply cannot be improved, reducing the fire load may reduce the required fire suppression demand.

Examples include:

• Lower storage heights
• Reduced combustible stock accumulation
• Separation of high-risk materials
• No idle pallets against walls or under canopies
• Removal of waste packaging
• Better control of flammable liquids
• Relocation of hazardous processes
• Limiting plastic, foam, aerosols or lithium battery storage

This is often one of the most practical interventions in warehouses and storage risks.

G. Compartmentation and passive fire protection

Where active fire suppression is constrained, passive fire protection becomes more important.

Interventions include:

• Fire-rated walls
• Fire doors
• Fire stopping around service penetrations
• Protected escape routes
• Fire-rated ceilings or shafts
• Separation between tenants
• Fire curtains or shutters
• Compartment size reduction

Passive measures do not extinguish a fire, but they can slow fire spread and reduce the scale of loss.

H. Detection and early warning improvements

Early detection can reduce the time between ignition and response.

Possible upgrades include:

• Addressable fire detection
• Smoke or heat detection in high-risk zones
• Linear heat detection in cable trays or storage areas
• Aspirating smoke detection for sensitive areas
• Alarm monitoring linked to response providers
• Remote pump and valve monitoring
• Low-pressure and low-water alarms

This is particularly useful where fire suppression capacity is marginal.

I. Occupancy and housekeeping controls

Insurers often respond positively where management controls are strong.

Priority controls include:

• Hot work permit system
• No uncontrolled welding, grinding or cutting
• Electrical thermographic inspections
• Formal battery charging controls
• Smoking controls
• Waste removal routines
• Pallet storage controls
• Contractor induction
• End-of-day fire checks
• Monthly fire equipment inspections

These are low-cost compared with tank and pump installations.

J. Fire brigade pre-planning

Where municipal water supply is unreliable, practical engagement with local fire services becomes important.

This may include:

• Pre-incident site visit
• Hydrant location mapping
• Identification of alternative water sources
• Access route planning
• Fire appliance access review
• Key box or emergency access arrangements
• On-site emergency contact details
• Identification of shut-off valves and fire sprinkler controls

This does not remove the need for adequate water, but it can improve response effectiveness.

K. Targeted suppression for critical areas

Where whole-building fire sprinkler upgrades are impractical, targeted systems may reduce the most serious exposures.

Examples include:

• Kitchen suppression
• Electrical room detection and suppression
• Server room clean-agent systems
• Battery charging area protection
• Localised water mist systems
• Foam systems for specific flammable liquid risks
• Deluge systems for defined high-hazard plant

These must be properly designed and accepted by the insurer, but they may be a practical compromise where full building retrofit is not possible.

L. Staged compliance plan

Where the insurer’s requirements are technically justified but financially or physically difficult, the owner should propose a staged plan rather than simply refusing.

A credible plan might include:

• Immediate flow testing and risk survey
• Urgent maintenance and valve/pump repairs
• Short-term fire load reduction
• Medium-term detection upgrades
• Medium-term storage or pump feasibility study
• Long-term capital project for fire water resilience

Insurers may be more receptive where the client can show seriousness, competence and measurable progress.

8. The basic approach

Frame the issue properly:

• Is there an actual measured municipal water pressure problem at the building?
• Does the fire sprinkler system depend on municipal water supply?
• Has the system been tested against current municipal water conditions?
• Is there evidence that the system still meets design requirements?
• If not, what is the shortfall?
• Is the insurer’s requested remedy practical?
• If not, what engineered alternatives can be proposed?
• Has the insurer accepted the alternative in writing?
• Are policy conditions being clearly explained to the client?

This is also a credibility opportunity. Many clients will not understand that a municipal water supply failure can become an insurance problem. Explaining it clearly allows the broker to move from “premium seller” to risk adviser.

9. Overall conclusion

Water pressure and availability are becoming a real and growing issue in South Africa’s major urban centres, especially where municipal water infrastructure is old, poorly maintained or operating above capacity. The problem is not the same in every city, but the trend is clear enough for insurers to treat municipal water dependency as a material underwriting concern.

For firefighting, unreliable water means slower, weaker and less certain fire suppression. For fire sprinkler systems, it can undermine the very foundation of the protection design. A fire sprinkler installation without dependable flow and pressure may give a false sense of security.

Insurers are therefore tightening requirements around ASIB compliance, dedicated fire water reserves, pumps, inspection records and risk survey recommendations. Policyholders are expected to prove that their fire protection systems are not merely installed, but capable of working when required.

The difficult practical issue is that tanks and pumps are not always feasible. In those cases, the answer is not to ignore the requirement or rely on informal assurances. The correct approach is to measure the problem, appoint competent fire engineering support, reduce the fire load where possible, strengthen passive fire protection and detection measures, consider distributed or shared water solutions, and obtain written insurer acceptance of any alternative plan.

Need expert advice on fire protection and insurance risks? Contact STP INTASURE to review your fire protection arrangements and ensure your business is adequately protected.